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ABSTRACT 
In this survey, we try to summarize what economists know about how increasing tax rate affects both tax evasion and 
the willingness to pay taxes. We show how this apparently trivial question presents puzzling results. This paper intro-
duces the main contributions that have attempted to explain the apparent contradiction between the empirical evidence 
on the reaction of taxpayers to changes in tax rate levels and the results obtained by the standard models of tax evasion. 
In an effort to shed some light on this issue, the paper primarily concludes that there is more than enough room for fur-
ther research on the relationship between tax evasion and tax rates given the many gaps in the literature concerning on 
this topic. 
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1. Introduction 
The need to reduce the short-term budget deficits of some 
depressed developed economies has put pressure on these 
economies to conduct hard and austere plans of fiscal 
consolidation. For the most part, these measures focus on 
reducing government spending. However, the economic 
recession and an increasing unemployment rate have not 
only generated more expenditures such as the payment of 
unemployment benefit, but also generated the fact that 
the unemployed do not pay taxes, which has also caused 
a dramatic drop in public revenue. To recoup this lost 
revenue, governments have included measures aiming at 
increasing the tax burden in their austerity plans.  
Detractors of this rising tax burden argue that this pol-
icy will decrease short-run economic activity (through 
demand side-effects) and/or long-run GDP (through sup-
ply side-effects). Moreover, the magnitude of some indi-
rect effects remains to be seen. This in itself has triggered 
a large open debate on the convenience of implementing 
these kinds of fiscal policies. One of these indirect ef-
fects concerns the tax evasion phenomenon. Most of the 
tax systems in developed countries are not immune to the 
fact that taxpayers try to reduce their fiscal burden using 
both legal and illegal strategies. 
According to the estimates of [1], the size of the sha- 
dow economy in countries like Mexico, Peru, Guatemala 
and Panama fluctuated between 40% and 60% of GDP 
over the period 1990-1993. In European countries, this 
percentage decreases substantially but remains signifi-
cant and disconcerting. For example in Spain, Italy, Por-
tugal and Greece, this percentage was between 24% and 
30% of GDP ten years ago. The phenomenon of tax eva-
sion is present even in countries with a consolidated fis-
cal system like the US. According to the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS), the percentage of tax evasion on in-
come in the US was around 16% in 2006. Although the 
available data on the magnitude of tax evasion are mere 
estimates, it is obvious that this phenomenon should not 
be regarded as marginal; every year it takes away sig-
nificant amounts of government revenues. 
It seems plausible to think that tax evasion (and/or cor-
ruption) has made the economic crisis worse in some 
European countries since tax evasion limits the capacity 
of governments to raise revenues. Furthermore, the pres-
ence of tax evasion tends to make taxpayers wary of the 
government and consequently less willing to pay taxes. 
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The report about combating tax fraud and evasion (Com-
mission contribution to the European Council of 22 May 
2013) states that: “The fight against tax fraud and eva-
sion is important both for the protection of national 
budget revenues and for the confidence of citizens in the 
fairness and effectiveness of tax systems”. Hence, one of 
the main points in the political agenda of developed 
countries should be to tackle and fight against tax evasion. 
Nevertheless, in order to determine how tax evasion 
could distort the fiscal measures, we want to analyze 
whether higher tax rates encourage or discourage tax 
evasion. Governments decide to increase tax rates be-
cause they expect to achieve higher revenues which may 
in turn allow them to balance their public deficits. If tax-
payers react to this tax increase by reducing their will-
ingness to pay taxes and determination to declare a lower 
level of income, government revenues do not increase as 
expected. Therefore, the austere fiscal policies planned 
and implemented by the government will not produce the 
desirable outcome. The main goal of this article is to try 
to shed some light on how a tax rate increase may affect 
the tax evasion phenomenon. 
Several empirical studies have documented that higher 
tax rates tend to stimulate tax evasion. However, from a 
theoretical point of view, the relationship between the tax 
rate level and the amount of evaded income is one ques-
tion that has not been satisfactorily resolved as of yet. 
This controversy started in the 70’s and continues to date, 
since most of the theoretical models predict that reported 
income increases as the tax rate increases. That is, in-
creasing tax rates discourages tax evasion. 
In this survey, we present the main contributions that 
attempt to explain the apparent contradiction between the 
empirical evidence on the reaction of taxpayers to 
changes in tax rate levels, and the results obtained by the 
standard models of tax evasion. Section 2 presents the 
standard model of tax evasion introduced by Allingham 
and Sandmo in [2]. Section 3 shows the empirical find-
ings on the relationship between tax rates and tax evasion. 
Most of these papers show a positive relationship but 
some studies question the robusticity of this result and 
propose alternative models that aim to explain the puz-
zling empirical and theoretical findings. Section 4 revises 
the theoretical papers that try to explain the apparent 
contradiction between the standard model in [2] and the 
empirical evidence. Finally, Sections 5 and 6 conclude 
that the relationship between tax rate and tax evasion is 
still ambiguous. Section 5 also proposes some measures 
aiming at mitigating the negative effects triggered by the 
tax evasion phenomenon. 
2. The Allingham and Sandmo and the 
Yitzhaki Model 
Allingham and Sandmo presented in [2] the first attempt 
to theoretically analyze the behaviour of the tax evasion 
phenomenon. They study the individual tax evasion 
problem through a portfolio selection approach. In their 
model, the taxpayer maximizes expected utility, weigh- 
ing the benefits of hiding income and remaining undis- 
covered, with the possibility of being caught and paying 
the corresponding fine. The likelihood of inspection and 
the penalty, in case taxpayers are caught, are key ele- 
ments in determining the optimal amount of income they 
are to declare. 
The main result of this seminal paper shows that under 
the plausible assumption of decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA), the sign of the relationship between 
the amount of reported income and the tax rate is am- 
biguous when the fine paid by an audited evader is pro- 
portional to the amount of unreported income. This am- 
biguity comes from the co-existence of two effects: the 
income and the substitution effect. On the one hand, the 
substitution effect tells us that when the penalty for 
evading is proportional to the amount of evaded income 
and given a level of declared income, a tax rate increase 
does not modify the value of the penalty that taxpayers 
must pay if inspected. This effect generates incentives to 
substitute evasion for honesty. On the other hand, the 
income effect tells us that the taxpayers are getting 
poorer because they must pay more taxes for the same 
amount of declared income. Specifically, this effect is 
positive under the assumption DARA. In reducing rich- 
ness, absolute risk aversion increases and, therefore, the 
taxpayer tend to reduce evasion in order to lower the risk 
of exposure. 
Yitzhaki in [3] considered the Allingham-Sandmo 
static economy (A-S) where the penalties were propor- 
tional to the amount of evaded taxes instead of the 
amount of evaded income. This modification makes the 
original A-S model more realistic since tax legislations 
of developed countries tend to implement these kinds of 
fine schemes. Nevertheless, this new element generates 
an unambiguous result which runs in the opposite direc-
tion of general empirical evidence. Concretely, Yitzhaki 
shows that in this new scenario the substitution effect 
disappears given that an increase in the tax rate implies a 
rise in the penalty that the taxpayer must pay if caught 
and, thus, there is no incentive to substitute evasion for 
honesty. Under the assumption of DARA, the income 
effect runs in the same direction as the A-S model; 
therefore, an increase in the tax rate provokes an increase 
in reported income. As we mentioned before, this unam-
biguous result is at odds with the empirical evidence. 
Several studies suggest that higher tax rates tend to 
stimulate tax evasion. The next section presents the most 
significant empirical articles concerning the tax evasion 
phenomenon. 
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3. Empirical Findings 
Before presenting the results of the empirical research, 
we have to highlight how difficult it is for researchers to 
get accurate data on tax compliance. Note that tax eva- 
sion is an illegal and shadow activity and its undercover 
nature makes it very hard to obtain reliable data. Re- 
searchers must, therefore, consider different approaches 
to measure it. The traditional approach is to use informa- 
tion from audits, from tax amnesty data or from ques- 
tionnaires in which taxpayers are asked about their 
non-compliance behaviour1. The papers presented here 
come from this empirical literature. But there is some 
recent literature that uses experimental economies to 
measure and analyze evasion behaviour2. At the end of 
this section, we will merely take a glance at a few con- 
tributions on tax evasion that come from experimental 
evidence. 
A pioneering work in the traditional empirical litera- 
ture on tax evasion was that of [7]. In the later paper, 
Clotfelter used 47,000 observations for 1969, provided 
by the US “Internal Revenue Service’s Taxpayer Com- 
pliance Program”. Clotfelter took as a measure of tax 
compliance the logarithm of evaded income in three dif- 
ferent taxpayer groups, according to the source of their 
income. Moreover, he included variables such as age, 
marital status, fiscal residence of taxpayers and other 
sources of income. The estimations suggested that higher 
marginal tax rates had a significant impact on the amount 
of detected evasion. The results were conclusive because 
in the three groups of taxpayers considered, the variable 
marginal tax rate positively affected the dependent 
evaded income variable. Specifically, elasticity values 
ranged from 0.515 to 0.844. This means that when taking 
a value for the marginal tax rate of 0.40, a decrease of 
10% of this value (becoming 0.36) results in an expected 
decline of evasion which can vary between 5% and 8%. 
Undoubtedly, these results are clearly consistent with the 
intuition that higher tax rates will encourage tax evasion. 
Nourzad and Crane have contributed extensively to 
this literature with three important contributions [8-10], 
in which empirical results are consistent with [7] since a 
higher tax rate leads to higher levels of tax evasion. The 
first work [8] analyzes the problem of tax evasion from a 
theoretical point of view by incorporating the interest 
rate in the A-S model with penalties in Yitzhaki. In this 
context, the introduction of the interest rate does not 
change the result originally obtained by Yitzhaki, since 
an increase in the tax rate also results in a lower evasion. 
To carry out the empirical analysis they used aggregate 
time series data. They analyzed how the proportion of 
evaded income was affected by variables like the prob- 
ability of auditing, the penalty (proportional to the 
amount of taxes evaded), the tax rate, real income, infla- 
tion and interest rate. The results revealed a clear positive 
relationship between evaded income and tax rate. The 
authors suggest that a possible explanation for the con- 
tradiction between the theoretical and the empirical re- 
sults may be the fact that the model considers a linear tax 
function while the data comes from a progressive tax 
system. With a progressive tax function, changes in tax 
rates affect both savings and consumption decisions, and 
generate an income effect as well as a substitution effect. 
So, if the substitution effect dominates the income effect, 
higher tax rates will also increase evasion. 
Later on, reference [9] analyzed the effect of tax rates 
on tax evasion by using aggregate US data for the period 
1941-1981. The study focused on the importance of vari- 
able inflation. It seems clear that inflation can affect the 
decision to evade. Inflation erodes the real value of 
nominal disposable income and this induces taxpayers to 
restore their purchasing power through tax evasion. 
Given the obvious difficulty of measuring tax evasion, 
the authors took as a tax evasion measure the difference 
between the Adjusted Gross Income (a proxy for accu- 
rate income) and the directly declared gross income to 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This difference can 
be interpreted as an aggregate measure of evaded income 
and, therefore, it is also an indicator of the magnitude of 
tax evasion. Independent variables were the marginal tax 
rate, the probability of auditing, the penalty (as a propor- 
tion of evaded taxes), real income, institutional variables 
and a variable trend (since the analysis was performed 
with time series). The results are consistent with previ- 
ous findings since higher marginal tax rates lead to 
greater tax evasion. In fact, estimates indicate that an 
increase in marginal tax rates not only increased the level 
of evasion but also increased the proportion of evaded 
income. This suggests that either the income effect had 
the same sign as the substitution effect, or the substitu- 
tion effect clearly dominated the income effect. 
Finally, reference [10] studies the impact of progres- 
sive tax functions in tax compliance. The analysis fo- 
cused on establishing a difference between marginal and 
average tax rates and their effect on tax evasion since 
most current tax systems are progressive. Based on their 
previous work [8], they conducted two types of exercises. 
First they re-estimated the original regression by taking 
the same dependent variable and including some addi- 
tional independent variables that might help explain the 
phenomenon of tax evasion. The obtained results repro- 
duce the previous one: a higher marginal tax rate gener- 
ated greater tax evasion. In a second step, they intro- 
duced the average tax rate as an explanatory variable. In 
this second regression, the marginal tax rate continued to 
have a positive impact on tax evasion. However, the av- 
erage tax rate reflected a significant and negative rela- 
1See [1,4,5] to know more about measuring tax evasion. 
2See in [6] the discussion on approaches to measure tax evasion. 
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tionship with tax evasion. The intuition for this result is 
that the average tax rate solely generates an income ef-
fect because it only affects disposable income, while a 
change in the marginal tax rate also affects relative prices. 
The implication of such a result, in terms of fiscal policy, 
is clear. A marginal tax rate decrease is usually associ- 
ated with a package of tax reforms that tend to increase 
the average rate to cater for the wish of governments to 
maintain their previous tax revenue3. The obtained re- 
sults reveal that a reduction of the marginal tax rate and 
an increase in the average tax rate both tend to reduce tax 
evasion and therefore tax revenue could increase. Grant- 
ed therefore that increasing the average rate is not strictly 
necessary to keep tax revenues constant, governments 
could relax the severity of their fiscal plans a little bit. 
Also noteworthy in this literature is the contribution 
made by Poterba in [11], who studied the effect of mar- 
ginal tax rates on tax compliance by analyzing time se- 
ries of declared capital income between 1965 and 1982. 
The relevance of this exercise is to take as the dependent 
variable the percentage of declared income from capital 
gains, since this type of income is subject to less tax con- 
trols and thus, the tax evasion phenomenon could easily 
make its presence. Poterba cites revealing data: while the 
percentage of wage-declared income is 94.9%, the com- 
pliance rate for capital gains is down to 64.3%. He used 
two different variables to measure the marginal tax rate 
on capital gains: the maximum statutory tax rate for 
capital gains in the long term, and a weighted average 
marginal tax rate for capital gains over time. The regres- 
sions carried out also included a trend to cover the poten- 
tial effects of inspection policy changes and other factors 
that might affect tax compliance. Poterba’s results sug- 
gest, without any doubt, that marginal tax rate negatively 
affects the income declared. As an example, using the 
maximum statutory tax rate as a measure of marginal rate, 
Poterba found that if the marginal tax rate increases by 
1%, the reported income decreases at 0.4%. 
Alm et al. conducted in [12] an ambitious empirical 
study aimed at investigating how tax compliance is af- 
fected by variables like deductions on salary income, tax 
rates, the probability of inspection and penalties. The 
novelty of this work is the use of the term non-compli- 
ance tax in its broadest sense, i.e. including all activities 
both legal (avoidance) and illegal (evasion) that aim to 
reduce the tax burden of an individual. This study was 
based on the tax system in Jamaica during 1983, for 
which a very detailed database was available with infor- 
mation on the types of deductions workers could apply to 
reduce their tax burden. In this case, the dependent vari- 
ables chosen were three folds: the proportion of total 
compensation over declared gross income, the proportion 
of total compensation over deductions and, finally, the 
proportion of total compensation over evaded income. 
The independent variables were the marginal tax rate, the 
probability of inspection, the penalty (which was propor- 
tional to the amount of tax evaded) and other variables 
that quantified the importance of deductions from salary 
income. The results reinforced those mentioned above. 
Lower tax rates induced taxpayers to increase their level 
of tax compliance. 
Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann present in [13] an 
empirical investigation on aggregate tax evasion using 
data for 25 Swiss cantons throughout the course of sev- 
eral years. In view of the difficulty to accurately detect 
evaded income, the authors chose as the dependent vari- 
able a measure of discrepancy between declared income 
data provided by tax reports, and the income measured 
by national accounts. The independent variables were the 
marginal tax rate (the average of the marginal rates as the 
Swiss tax system is progressive), the probability of in- 
spection, the fine (proportional to the amount of evaded 
tax), deductions, the percentage of unearned income, 
elderly taxpayers (since they could have more experience 
in tax issues) and a dummy. Running the regressions they 
obtained that the estimated coefficient of marginal tax 
rate was positive and significant, which again indicated 
the existence of a positive relationship between the tax 
rates and evaded income. Once more this result was con- 
sistent with previous empirical work. In a similar line, 
reference [14] used data from Germany to find evidence 
to suggest that higher tax rates tend to stimulate tax eva- 
sion. 
Another interesting work is [15]. These authors exam- 
ine the influence of taxes and subsidies on declared la- 
bour income. They use a sample of 3219 observations for 
the year 1988 in households classified as low income4. 
As in [7], the sample was divided into two types of oc- 
cupations. This allowed for a better analysis of the de- 
terminants of tax compliance. The dependent variable 
was the mistakenly declared income, defined as the dif-
ference between the corrected wage income and declared 
wage income. Notice that this term means that the eva- 
sion phenomenon is understood either as declaring a 
lower income than the actual income or the phenomenon 
of over-declaration, i.e., declaring an income which is 
higher than what they actually earn. Independent vari- 
ables included the probability of inspection, the marginal 
tax rate, income, marital status, age and a variable re- 
flecting the origin of subsidies. The results are qualita- 
tively consistent with those obtained by [7] since an in- 
crease in the marginal tax rate translates into evading a 
higher income. Still, reference [15] qualifies the effect of 
3An example of this type of measure would be the elimination or reduc-
tion of deductions to taxpayers according to their personal characteris-
tics. 
4They use data from the “Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Pro-
gram”. 
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marginal tax rate on income evaded as moderate because, 
even though the estimated parameter value is positive, in 
some cases it is not significantly different from zero5. 
Regarding this last comment, we must point out that 
although all of these empirical papers support the idea 
that a higher tax rate encourages evasion, some papers 
find an ambiguous relationship between tax rates and tax 
evasion. We will now present the two most well-known 
studies in this area. The first of them is the article [16] by 
Slemrod who, using US cross-sectional data for the year 
1977, studied the relationship between tax evasion and 
variables like the marginal tax rate, real income, age and 
marital status. The results obtained on demographic vari- 
ables are consistent with previous findings by other au- 
thors. Slemrod, however, could not confirm the positive 
correlation between marginal tax rates and evasion. His 
argument to support this claim was based on the fact that 
it was not possible to distinguish between the effect of an 
increase in the marginal rate and the increase of income 
on tax evasion. It was evident that simultaneous increases 
in the two variables had a positive effect on evasion but 
these two effects could not be separated. 
The second study in [17] was conducted by Feinstein 
who used data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
in the US for the years 1982 and 1985. The dependent 
variable was the evaded net income. The independent 
variables were, among others, the marginal tax rate, real 
income, age, marital status, and the type of occupation. 
He estimated the two years separately and then deflated 
the 1985 data in order to express a third estimate for the 
total sample in 1982 dollars. The separate estimation of 
two years confirmed the positive relationship between 
avoidance and marginal rates. However, Feinstein was 
doubtful about this result because it is in fact very diffi- 
cult to isolate the effect of the marginal tax rate on the 
evasion of total income effects. Instead, these two effects 
(the effect of marginal and income effect) could be iden- 
tified by estimating the total sample. Note that the two 
observations with the same income marginal rates faced 
different if they were in different years. The results ob- 
tained in the estimation of this third model are clear and 
very significant: the marginal tax rate has a negative ef- 
fect on evasion. In this case the theoretical result ob- 
tained by Yitzhaki is confirmed. 
Let us finally take a look at experimental economy. 
Research presented in [18] used laboratory market ex- 
periments to find that higher taxes stimulate tax evasion. 
More recently, reference [19] performed a randomized 
tax enforcement experiment in Denmark. They discov- 
ered that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax 
evasion, but that this effect is small as compared to avoi- 
dance responses. However, we can also find some ex- 
perimental evidence to the contrary. Thus contributions 
[20] and [21] found that higher tax rates have a negative 
impact on tax evasion6.  
4. Theoretical Results  
As of [3] there have been many authors who have sought 
to resolve the ambiguity posed by the traditional portfo- 
lio model with respect to the sign of the relationship be- 
tween tax rate and tax evasion. All of them introduce 
new elements to enrich the original model and to obtain 
the expected result: that increases in tax rates lead to 
greater evasion. In line with this, reference [23] modified 
his previous model by assuming that the probability of 
being caught evading is an increasing function of the 
amount of undeclared income. In this context, he was 
able to show that an increase in the marginal tax rate en-
courages tax evasion. 
An alternative research on tax evasion focused on the 
fact that chances for evasion differ among occupations 
and sectors. Reference [24] was the first to introduce a 
two-sector model, instead of the portfolio framework, to 
analyze the tax evasion problem. In his model, the eco- 
nomy has an evadable sector and a non-evadable sector. 
However, Watson’s research yields ambiguous results. 
Without restrictions on absolute and relative risk aver- 
sion, it is impossible to predict how changes in tax rate 
will affect evasion. He is only able to prove that, given 
some conditions and under non-decreasing relative risk 
aversion, a rise in the tax rate will increase the proportion 
of tax evaders. Reference [25] proved that in the Watson 
model, under IARA (DARA) a rise in the tax rate in- 
creases (decreases) the number of workers in the evad- 
able sector. Therefore, the odd results still yield7. 
Back to the A-S portfolio benchmark, many papers 
have tried to generate that positive relationship through 
substantial departures from Yitzhaki’s original model. 
These extensions add realism to the original model, but 
in general, the conclusions on the relationship between 
tax rates and compliance are not completely satisfactory. 
For instance, [26] introduced public goods in the original 
model to try to see the relationship between the provision 
of public goods and the payment of taxes by taxpayers. 
The public good is financed by the funds raised through 
taxes paid by taxpayers in an economy where these same 
taxpayers behave as evaders. The utility of individuals 
depends on their level of private consumption and the 
level of public good consumption. Thus, an increase in 
6The experimental economy also has growing interest in tax evasion. 
See, for instance [22], who analyze how the changes in sanctions and 
detection enhancement produce an improvement in tax compliance yet 
they do not analyze the effect of changes in tax rates. 
7These papers with multi-sector economy models are known as the 
literature on underground economy. 
5The authors emphasize that their results are only applicable to low-
income taxpayers and may not be extrapolated to higher-income tax-
payers since they probably have greater opportunities to evade part of 
their income. 
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the rate is linked to an increase in the amount of public 
good provided. Analyzing the economy under the as- 
sumption of DARA, they encounter the same odd result 
as Yitzhaki does when the marginal utility of private 
consumption is not affected by the level of public good. 
In contrast, when the marginal utility of private con- 
sumption is affected by the provision of public goods, 
their result is drastically different. They find that when 
the tax rate increases, so does the amount of tax evaded. 
Although [26] presents results directed towards ex- 
plaining the observed positive relationship between the 
tax rate and tax evasion, they cannot capture why non- 
evader behaviour prevails. To try to collect these effects, 
[27] appealed to the literature of “social norms” to find a 
reason to induce a loss of utility in evading taxpayers 
simply by performing the action to be evaded. Gordon 
called this effect the “psychological cost” of tax evasion 
and assumed that this grew as did the amount of income 
evaded. As allowed the assessment of this cost individual 
and subjective psychological out, taxpayers were divided 
into two types: evaders and avoiders. In this scenario a 
tax rate increase may lead a greater number of taxpayers 
to evade because the psychological cost of being an 
evader decreases as tax rates increase. However, the re- 
sult obtained by [27] neither guarantees that individual 
evasion increases as the tax rate increases nor that ag- 
gregate evasion is greater than it was before. 
In a new attempt to reconcile the theoretical and the 
empirical versions, contribution [28] proposed a two- 
period tax evasion model. In the first period each indi- 
vidual received an exogenous income. They decided how 
much they wanted to consume and how much they 
wanted to save. In the second period of life they only had 
income from their savings. Therefore, the taxpayer had to 
decide what fraction of the income from investment they 
would not declare to tax authorities. If detected, the tax- 
payer was fined proportional to the amount of tax evaded. 
The most important point of this paper refers to the like- 
lihood of inspection. Klepper et al. modelled the fre- 
quency with which inspections were carried out as a 
function that basically depends on three variables: the 
fraction of capital income evaded, total evaded income 
and a variable measuring the characteristics that could 
affect the decision to evade. Results indicated that a 
higher tax rate discouraged savings and the proportion of 
evaded income was higher. The intuition of this result 
lies in the fact that if the tax rate increases, the savings is 
reduced while causing a reduction in the individual’s 
income in the second period of his life. This result is con-
tingent on the probability of inspection. So taxpayers 
obviously take advantage of this decrease in the risk of 
being audited and they increase the rate at which they 
evade their capital income. 
Following this line of research, [29] builds a Ricardian 
framework where the tax evasion implications of an in-
crease in the tax rate are independent of the crowding-out 
effect of public investment. To this end, Panadés also 
considers a two-period model. In the first period of life, 
individuals receive exogenous income that is subject to a 
proportional tax. Taxpayers maximize expected utility by 
choosing the level of declared income and the desired 
amount of saved income. If caught by tax authorities the 
taxpayer has to pay a fine proportional to the amount of 
income evaded. In their second period of life, individuals 
only receive the capital income accrued from their effec-
tive saving. Individuals face an exogenous probability of 
inspection. Moreover, they have to pay lump-sum taxes 
in both periods of life. In performing a standard Ricar-
dian exercise, Panadés illustrates that if an increase in the 
tax rate takes place, taxpayers know that they will be 
compensated with a reduction in the lump-sum tax in 
their second period of life. Although the sign of the rela-
tionship between saving and the tax rate is ambiguous, 
the relationship between declared income and the tax rate 
is clearly consistent with the empirical results, since a 
higher tax rate leads to less declared income. The intui-
tion of this result is based on the combination of the 
aforementioned substitution effect and income effect. A 
higher tax rate decreases the return to evade, since under 
DARA, lower income makes, via income effect, the eva-
sion less attractive. However, a higher tax rate also has a 
substitution effect which reduces reported income. Yet 
an additional effect remains to be considered within this 
context: the compensation received by the individual via 
lump-sum tax in the second period of life. In this case, 
the compensation via lump-sum taxes overrides the in-
come effect, so that it only survives the substitution ef-
fect. This allows us to conclude that if the tax rate in-
creases, evasion will do so too. However, it should be 
noted, that when fines proportionate to the amount of tax 
evaded are taken, the results are totally opposite. That is, 
the results are identical to those of [3]: the relationship 
between tax evasion and tax rate is negative. 
Reference [30] presents a modification of the A-S 
model which introduces the possibility of self-insurance 
against possible penalties if the taxpayer is audited. In 
this model the taxpayer maximizes expected utility by 
choosing the level of declared income and effort not to 
be discovered. The results show that the fact of being 
over-insured encourages individuals to take more risks or, 
equivalently, to avoid a larger amount of their income. 
So, in this context there are two opposite effects: on the 
one hand, the traditional income effect which appeared in 
the original model (positive) and, on the other, the effect 
associated to the ability of the taxpayer to insure against 
an inspection (negative sign). Consequently an increase 
(decrease) in the tax rate will lead to higher (lower) tax 
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evasion if the impact of insurance is higher (lower) than 
the income effect. 
Reference [31] departs from the standard A-S model 
by making taxpayer utility depend on their relative tax 
contribution. Thus, she introduces an equilibrium model 
in which the utility function of taxpayers depend both on 
the amount of their own individual consumption and 
their relative tax contribution. The analysis shows that an 
increase in the tax rate could induce taxpayers to raise 
the amount of unreported income when penalties are im-
posed on the amount of evaded taxes. This is so because 
individuals coordinate to report so low that declaring 
more income than the rest taxpayers, is heavily penalized. 
At this low-income report equilibrium, a tax rate increase 
results in more income being concealed from the tax au-
thority. 
Finally, another puzzling contribution comes from [32] 
who analyze how the rate of economic growth and the 
fraction of income declared by taxpayers vary with the 
tax rate. In this paper, they have shown that the negative 
theoretical relationship between unreported income and 
tax rates is preserved in a multi-period economy when 
fines are imposed on the amount of evaded taxes. How-
ever, under the assumption that the fine paid by caught 
evaders is proportional to the amount of evaded income, 
the sign of the previous relation is reversed. 
Of course, there are more papers on tax evasion than 
those presented in this survey, but our aim here is to pre-
sent the main papers attempting to respond to the ques-
tion we pointed out. Thus, papers along this line that 
analyze other issues on tax compliance behaviour over 
the last decade are [33-35] among many others. 
5. Discussion and Final Remarks 
The motivation of this survey is to shed light on policy 
debates often claiming that a higher tax rate encourages 
evasion. We have shown that the theory does not provide 
a clear prediction. Paraphrasing Sandmo in [36]: “Is the 
existence of tax evasion an argument for a lower mar-
ginal tax rate? We have seen that the optimal tax analy-
sis does not offer any clear conclusion on this point”. 
Although most of the theoretical models predict that re-
ported income increases with the tax rate, widely held 
empirical evidence runs in the opposite direction. Hence, 
most empirical studies support the idea that a higher tax 
rate encourages evasion, even though some papers are 
doubtful about this result. 
When tax evasion is present, the effects of a raise in 
the tax rate on the tax revenue are not well defined  
Despite the fact that economic literature lacks a clear 
conclusion to this respect, we would like to give some 
recommendations to illustrate the potential distortion that 
tax evasion may produce to the expected effects of fiscal 
policy. Let us assume the most realistic framework, that 
is, taxpayer exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion 
and the fines for evading are proportional to the evaded 
taxes8. In this context, standard theoretical models pre-
dict that an increase in the tax rate will result in a higher 
declared income and hence an increase in tax revenues. 
On the contrary, empirical evidence shows that when the 
tax rate goes up taxpayers evade a higher amount of their 
income and this fact generates a negative effect on tax 
revenue. However, even if taxpayers behave according to 
the prediction of the empirical evidence, the negative 
effect of the tax evasion on the tax revenue does not 
overcome the positive effect of an increase in the tax rate. 
Therefore, the tax revenue will increase as the tax rate 
increases. We claim that governments have bear in mind 
that the consequences of their tax reforms could vary 
depending on the magnitude of tax evasion activities. 
More tax evasion could imply a lower increase in tax 
revenue when the tax rate rises. 
The question that now arises is: What can govern-
ments do to reduce this negative effect on tax revenue 
consequent to the tax evasion phenomenon? The answer 
is far from straightforward, because there are pros and 
cons to the alternative measures that governments could 
put to use. One possible option would be to implement a 
fiscal system where taxpayers could choose to either pay 
a fixed amount of taxes set by the tax authorities and thus 
be exempt from tax inspection, or to only pay an amount 
chosen by taxpayers according to their declared income 
but be subject to a positive probability of being audited. 
These types of policies would effectively enable the 
government to collect the amount of taxes they had 
originally intended to collect. The main disadvantage of 
this option is that this type of fiscal system is less pro-
gressive than the current fiscal system (or maybe even 
regressive) and may leave the income distribution unim-
proved after taxes (or may even worsen it). 
Governments could also implement a more severe tax 
enforcement policy to get rid of the incentives to evade. 
In this case, even if taxpayers reacted to an increase in 
the tax rate by evading more, the magnitude of the afore- 
mentioned negative effect on the tax revenue would be 
smaller and governments would be able to obtain more 
resources to mitigate the fiscal deficit issue. The main 
disadvantage of this option lies in the fact that, for exam- 
ple, an increase in the probability of inspection requires 
the allocation of more resources to pay for more inspec- 
tors. 
6. Conclusion 
Since the economic literature is not clearly conclusive 
8Although the empirical evidence does not yield a conclusive result, it 
generally tends to support the assumption that the most tested hypothe-
ses are the constant relative risk aversion hypothesis and the decreasing 
absolute risk aversion hypothesis. 
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about the consequences of tax rate changes on tax eva-
sion, it is evident that this topic still requires further re-
search. As Alm declares in [6]: “My basic conclusion is a 
simple one: we have learned a lot in the last 40 years but 
there are still major gaps in our understanding. Indeed, 
we are still trying to answer many basic questions […] 
Do higher tax rates encourage/discourage [tax] compli-
ance?” 
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